mm-news-@dmin Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s mutual security pact represents something more significant than the continuity of the partnership
- Gulf allies lose faith in apathetic, unpredictable American support.
- Pakistan offers nuclear cover amid regional insecurity and realignment.
- India, Iran, and Israel are uneasy as new alliances reshape the regional order.
With decades of collaboration behind them, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s recent announcement of a mutual security agreement might seem like just a formality confirming their ongoing partnership. However, it represents something far more significant.
According to Bloomberg, this pact serves as the first tangible sign of what a post-American world could entail, one characterised by increased insecurity, instability, and uncertainty.
The two nations were indeed close for decades. In 1967, two months after Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, they signed a security agreement in which the country’s battle-hardened military promised training and support to the Kingdom. Two years later, Pakistani pilots flew for Saudi Arabia in its war against communist South Yemen.
By the 1980s, the generals in Rawalpindi had sent their ally 15,000 soldiers to help protect a regime unnerved by the siege of Mecca in 1979. Pakistan even stationed tanks at Tabuk near the Kingdom’s northwest border, a short drive from Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. But such closeness seemed consigned to the history books in 2015 after Pakistan’s National Assembly unexpectedly defied Riyadh — and perhaps their own military — by refusing to send soldiers to fight the Houthis.
The Saudis grew outraged, especially after long bankrolling their increasingly improvident friends, having sent a $1.5 billion “gift” the previous year. But Chinese money had begun to flow as well, and the petrodollar was no longer the only game in town. The civilian politicians in Islamabad felt they could take a few risks and reclaim a bit of sovereignty.
In the decade that followed, Saudi Arabia instead developed an ever-closer relationship with India. Pakistan must now repay or roll over Saudi grants that turned into loans, while China focuses on buying Russia’s loyalty.
Pakistan’s leaders know that they have not been able to fix the fundamental reason their country constantly teeters on the edge of bankruptcy: It buys more from the world than it has to sell. All they’ve invested in for decades is the military — and so, today, they have nothing else to offer a partner.
But that is an attractive enough offer for a Riyadh that is as uncertain today as it was in the 1970s. For decades, the Gulf monarchies have relied on the US for protection, support, and weapons. They have gone out of their way to woo the current president, as well. Qatar famously gave him a $400 million jet to use as Air Force One.
Israeli jets bombed the emirate earlier this month, even though it hosts the largest US base in the Middle East and a hotel housing Hamas leaders. The Qataris insisted that any American warnings about the attack came 10 minutes after the strikes had already begun.
This was the second time that Qatar had been attacked this year, in June. Iran launched missiles at the US’s Al Udeid airbase. In other words, they were successively bombed by America’s adversary and its ally. Washington itself did nothing in either case.
Countries naturally think now that an apathetic US may be more trouble than it’s worth, and look for help elsewhere. That’s led the Saudis back to Pakistan, which can offer worried former American satellites something few others will: A nuclear umbrella.
Riyadh’s other partners aren’t too pleased. New Delhi, in particular, has rejoiced in recent years at Pakistan’s “isolation” from its old friends in the Gulf. Policymakers here will have been informed of the Saudis’ decision in advance and understand the reasoning behind it.
But it still stings, especially as India’s own choices have led it here. It has grown as close to Israel in the past decade as it has to Saudi Arabia, perhaps closer. That reduces its usefulness to either. The limits of this hedging strategy have become painfully clear. It tried to enhance its relationship with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, and so, in the current crisis, none of them feels they can rely on New Delhi. A friend to all, it turns out, is a friend to none.
This once applied to Pakistan as well. Which has tried to embrace the Taliban, the Chinese, the Americans, and the Gulf. But it is now at odds with Kabul, and the US has turned away from the region. Paradoxically, Islamabad’s strategic choices have become much easier.
Nobody is entirely happy. Like other patrons, the Saudis are tired of Pakistan’s government, which over-promises and under-delivers. Israelis recognise that their “normalisation” with Saudi Arabia will face further delays. Pakistan has surrendered the autonomy it gained in 2015. Indians worry that Islamabad has regained acceptance, while Iranians feel encircled. And when sense returns to Washington, policymakers will regret allowing a fresh alliance. Between the Middle East’s richest country and Beijing’s most loyal client.
That’s what the post-American world will look like. Without the US, others will make whatever makeshift security arrangements they can. Some may be unpalatable, even destabilising. Nobody will feel better off — including Washington.
